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Abstract
We present a model of the evolution of identity via dynamic inter-
action between the choice of education and the transmission of values
in a community from parents to children, when parents care about the
preservation of their traditional community values, di¤erent from the val-
ues of the host society. We compare the educational and socio-economic
outcomes in di¤erent scenarios (melting pot versus multiculturalism). If
schooling shifts childrens identity away from their parents values par-
ents may choose lower levels of education for their children, at the cost
of reducing their future earnings. We show how this e¤ect can be attenu-
ated and reversed when the school or, indeed, the host society are willing
to accommodate the values of the community and/or to adjust to these
values; otherwise the community gradually becomes alienated. This ap-
proach may be applied to the analysis of temporal changes in values and
attitudes in a community of immigrants, as well as ethnic, religious, or
other minority groups.
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1 Introduction
Immigration has featured as an increasingly important political issue in Euro-
pean debates over the past two decades, and the integration of migrants into
their host societies is a subject raising anxieties both in the recipient countries
and amongst the migrants themselves. One of the most important channels
for integration is the schooling process. In the United Kingdom, nearly three
quarters of teachers (72%) regard the promotion of British values as part of a
teachers role, with one in ve teachers (21%) seeing this as a central part.1 This
is despite the fact that the poll found that there were a signicant proportion
of teachers (36%) who did not identify strongly as being British.2 For many
immigrant communities the consequence of schooling is that their values and
the values of the host society gradually converge over time until the commu-
nity is assimilated within the host. One remarkable example is the history of
the Jewish community that developed in the East End of London from 1880
onwards. Approximately 120,000 immigrants from Eastern Europe settled in
Spitalelds between 1881 and 1914 with the concentration such that the pop-
ulation of some districts was up to 95 per cent Jewish; the area had over 40
synagogues, and Yiddish was the predominant language on street signs and in
newspapers. However, according to the Board of Trade report of 1894, children
left the JewsFree School on Bell Lane almost indistinguishablefrom English
children. Religious rituals also gradually became less distinctive, and fewer peo-
ple spoke Yiddish.3 This once large, vibrant and distinctive community has
now been entirely absorbed into British society and, in the East End, only the
historical record remains.
This paper models how the values of the host society, promoted by the system
of education, and the values of a migrant community interact in shaping the
identity of the new generation of the community members. The analysis shows
how values change across generations when childrens values are shaped both
by their families and their schooling, so that the reference norms for each new
generation can be di¤erent from those of the previous one. We trace the dynamic
interaction between the values and show when the process will lead to either
assimilation of the community or lasting separation between the community and
the host society. The important policy conclusion is that separation results from
the education of community children being restricted by their parents to prevent
or minimize exposure to host society values. This leaves the community in a
permanently disadvantaged economic position due to the low level of education
that is chosen.
There exists a large literature looking at the social and economic position of
migrants and their children in Europe and North America (for a comprehensive
1Data from YouGov research, commissioned by Teachers TV.
2Press release of Teachers TV published online (http://www.teachers.tv/node/29223). Re-
search was conducted online by YouGov Plc between 17th and 22nd September 2008. YouGov
interviewed 643 primary and secondary school teachers. Results have not been weighted.
YouGov is a member of the British Polling Council.
3http://www.bbc.co.uk/legacies/immig_emig/england/london/article_2.shtml. Accessed
on April 17, 2014.
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review see Corak, 2004; and for a recent study of the Canadian case see Aydemir
et al., 2009, 2013). The common nding is that some socioeconomic outcomes
are transmitted from immigrant parents to their children, though convergence
to host society outcomes also occurs over time. For example, Blau et al. (2008)
found that after two generations education and labour supply of immigrants
converge to those of the host population (between 4% and 13% of education
and between 3% and 4%of labour supply shortfall); fertility, however, shows
more persistence (between 16% and 42% of excess fertility remains).
Research on the evolution of ethnic identity by immigrants shows that values
are important to the process of creating an ethnic identity and the latter is then
an important determinant of economic choices. Constant et al. (2009) dene
ethnic identity as the balance between commitment or self-identication with
the culture and society of origin and commitment or self-identication with the
host culture and society, achieved by an individual after migration (p. 276),
and discuss possible outcomes of the process in terms of assimilation (cultural
and social conformity), integration (strong identication with ethnic culture and
social conformity to host society), marginalization (weak cultural identication
and weak social conformity), and separation (strong identication to culture
of origin and weak involvement in host society). Reese (2001) discusses the
adaptive struggle faced by Mexican immigrants in the United States trying to
raise children who would do well economically but not fall prey to the moral
dangersof the host society. These processes are not uniform across immigrant
communities and depend on a variety of factors, including childrens gender:
Patel et al. (1996), for example, show for the case of Gujarati immigrant families
in the US that parental attitudes and behavior are a¤ected di¤erently by factors
such as modernity, acculturation, and time in the US, depending on parents
and childs gender.
These ndings, and similar ndings in the sociological and economic liter-
ature, provide evidence of a process of values transmission across generations,
inuenced by the values of the host society and mediated by various policy
channels addressing social inclusion. In this paper we concentrate on the e¤ect
of education, and, in particular, on the mitigation of the degree of conformity
with school norms by the conformity with community norms (a reection of
the ethnic and social mix of the neighborhood of residence). In our model the
frame of reference for each generation are the norms of their parents and those
of the host society. Social norms and values have long featured in explanations
of individual and group behavior by economists since the early work on social
norms and conformism by Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984). At the same time,
the role of identity in individual welfare and decision-making has only relatively
recently featured in economic models. Our approach falls within the tradition
of the economics of social norms and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) in
which norms act as motivating devices and the inherent sociability of humans
creates a loss of utility from not conforming with the prevailing norms. The key
assumption in our model is of two-way interaction of values between a minority
community and the host society. This interaction occurs through the system
of education, so that the evolution of values over time is determined endoge-
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nously. This is in contrast to the approach introduced by Bisin and Verdier
(2001) and developed, for example, in Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) and Cor-
neo and Jeanne (2009, 2010), who model the evolution of values as a random
process with exogenously xed probability distribution. Dasgupta and Kanbur
(2005, 2007) consider a similar interaction between the values of two coexisting
communities. In their framework values are modelled as a local public good,
with members of the community a¤ecting them directly by choosing their con-
tributions towards its provision. In our model the behavior of agents a¤ects the
values indirectly, through the choice of education.
In the next section we present our model of educational choice and char-
acterize the potential steady state equilibria. Section 3 explores multiplicity of
equilibria in more detail using numerical simulations. In Section 4 we discuss
the policy implications of the results and provide conclusions. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a community of n families whose traditional values di¤er from the
values of the host society outside the community. This could, for example, be
a community of immigrants or a religious minority. To analyze the dynamics
of the community values when new generations are exposed to the external
society values through the education process we use a two-period overlapping
generations model. Schooling is received in the rst period of life, and in the
second period each adult works. Each adult has only one child, and so there is
no population growth.4 Earnings depend on education received, and are divided
between consumption and investment in the education of the child. There is
intergenerational altruism which motivates the provision of education; there are
no bequests.
In the rst period of life each individual receives education with the amount
chosen by their parent. There is a minimal level of education, or basic skills,
that can be obtained by home schooling at no cost; without loss of generality
we normalize it to zero. Any formal education beyond this minimal level has
a material cost. In the second period each individual works and divides their
earnings between consumption and investment in education of their o¤spring.
The formal education system is maintained by the host society and performs
two roles: an academic role and a social role. In the academic role education
enhances a students skills and, therefore, increases his or her future labour
earnings. In the social role it promotes the values of the host society and, there-
fore, a¤ects the identity of a student. Parents care about their o¤springsfuture
wealth, as well as about preserving traditional values of the community. In par-
ticular, they dislike their childrens values deviating from the values currently
prevailing in the community.
4Population growth is a relevant issue since the e¤ect of a community of social values can
be inuenced by its relative size. We leave analysis of that possiblity to later work.
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The adult member of family i at time t has values given by it. The parameter
it can be interpreted as an aggregate of a number of factors (for example, respect
for elderly, status of women, tolerance to pre-marital relationships, religiosity).
The community mean value is the mean of the values of the adults alive at time
t
Ct =
1
n
nX
i=1
it: (1)
The preferences of adult i at time t are described by
U it = u
 
xit

+ v
 
wit+1
  ghit+1   Ct i2 ;
where xit is consumption of the adult, w
i
t+1 the wage that their child receives
in t + 1; and it+1 denotes the values of the child. We impose the standard
assumptions that u0; v0; g0 > 0, and u00; v00 < 0. We also assume that g (0) = 0
and g > 0 everywhere else.
The childs value of it+1 depends on the education received, e
i
t, the parents
values, it, and the values prevailing in the host society and promoted by the
schooling system, Ht . We model 
i
t+1 as a weighted sum of 
i
t and 
H
t :
it+1
 
eit

=

1    eit it +   eit Ht : (2)
The weighting function, 
 
eit

, is assumed to satisfy
 (0) = 0; 0 (e) > 0; 00 (e)  0;  (e)  1 8e  0: (3)
Thus, when community members are not exposed to education outside the com-
munity their values do not change. This assumption is consistent with nd-
ings from longitudinal studies of the children of immigrants. Furthermore, the
assumption that the weight on host society values increases at a decreasing
rate with education implies that primary education (eit close to zero) has the
strongest leverage on values. Thus, for a given a level of education, an individual
will develop values closer to the community if the leverage of primary education
on values is small and they are further from school norms (Akerlof and Kranton,
2002). Conversely, an individual will develop values closer to those of the host
society values if the leverage of primary education on values is large (Phinney
et al., 2000) and they have a better initial t with school norms (Goldin and
Katz, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999).
The adult in family i at time t chooses xit and e
i
t to maximize their utility,
Ut, subject to
eit  0 and w
 
eit 1
  xit + c  eit ;
where c (e) is the cost of education and w (e) is the relationship between the
wage and education. We assume that
w (0) = w0 > 0; w
0 > 0; w00  0; c (0) = 0; c0 > 0; c00 > 0:
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At the optimum the budget constraint binds, and the optimal eit is determined
by the rst-order condition along with the complementary slackness condition,  u0c0  eit+ v0w0  eit  2g00  eitL(it; eit)  0;
eit  0;
(4)
where
L(it; e
i
t) =
h
Ht   it
i h
it   Ct
i
+ 
 
eit
 h
Ht   it
i2
: (5)
At an interior optimum the rst condition becomes an equality, so the chosen
level of education equalizes the marginal benet from education to the marginal
cost of education comprised of the physical cost of education and the marginal
disutility from the change in the o¤springs values caused by school education.
When marginal cost exceeds marginal benet at et = 0 the optimal choice of
education is zero.
It follows from the individual choice of education level that we can write
eit = e

it; 
C
t ; 
H
t

:
The evolution of individual values conditional on the process
n
Ht
o
is then given
by the n rst-order di¤erence equations
it+1 =
h
1  

e

it; 
C
t ; 
H
t
i
it + 

e

it; 
C
t ; 
H
t

Ht ;
and the solutions combine to give the mean value in (1). The process
n
Ht
o
and the di¤erence equations determine the dynamics of values starting from any
initial position
n
ei 1
	
;

i0
	
; H0
o
:
We consider two scenarios for the process
n
Ht
o
:
P1. Ht is exogenously xed:
Ht = 
H 8t = 0; 1; : : :
In this scenario the values of the host society promoted by the educational
system are not inuenced by the community nor do they change over time.
P2. Ht evolves according to the process:
Ht+1 = f

Ht ; 
C
t

:
This process is intended to describe a situation when the community is
inuential, perhaps, because of its large size or the scope of activities, so
that its values a¤ect the values of the host society.5
5The e¤ect of relative population sizes could be modelled by extending this function.
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2.1 Steady state: separation and assimilation
We dene a steady state of the economy as one characterized by a constant level
of education across the generations in the same family, and constant community
and social values. It is now shown that there are several possible types of steady
state with di¤erent implications for social structure.
The rst result shows that an extreme outcome is possible in which the com-
munity remains separated from the host society. To state the result succinctly,
let F
 
i0
   u0c0 (0) + v0w0 (0)  2g00 (0) hH0   i0i hi0   C0 i :
Lemma 1 (Separation) If Ht follows process P1 and, at time 0, F
 
i0

< 0 for
all i = 1; :::; n; then eit = 0 and 
i
t = 
i
0 for all i = 0; :::; n and t  0.
The outcome described in Lemma 1 is one in which no family in the commu-
nity chooses to invest in education. As a consequence the values of the families
in the community remain constant from generation to generation, and remain
at a constant distance from the values of the host society. This steady state
represents separation between the community and the host society. Moreover,
because no education is undertaken the incomes of the community members
remain at the minimum level. The families in the community rationally make
the choice to accept low living standards in order to prevent the erosion of
traditional community values.
It should be noted that a necessary condition for the outcome in lemma 1
to occur is that
 u0c0 (0) + v0w0 (0) < 0;
because either i0 = 
C
0 all i = 1; :::; n; or else 
i
0   C0 < 0 for some i and
i0 C0 > 0 for some i: This shows that the outcome with separation may occur
when education is prohibitively expensive, or the returns to education are low.
The result that no one in the community chooses to obtain formal education
is a very strong one, and, perhaps, unlikely to be observed in practice.6 It is
more interesting to explore which of the families in the community will choose
to obtain education in those cases where some, but not all, choose to do so. In
what follows we choose the index for the community members so that 10  20 
    n0 , and dene the measure for  such that if gives the order C0  n0 < H0 .
We then dene
 =
H0 + 
C
0
2
:
Lemma 2 If F () < 0 and ei0 > 0 for any i;then e
1
0 > 0 and/or e
n
0 > 0.
6The closest well-documented example to this outcome are the Amish communities in the
United States. The Amish are one of the most conservative religious sects in America. They
teach their children in their own schools up to the eigth grade level and do not encourage
education above this level: The Amish feel that a child who achieves a level of scholarship
beyond the fundamentals of the primary grades is likely to leave the community and be lost
to the church. More importantly, if a child spends the great part of his day at the high school,
there is less chance he will learn to appreciate the Amish way of life. (Knudsen, 1974.)
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Lemma 2 shows that the community families choosing to educate their chil-
dren will be drawn from those farthest from the community value on either
side, that is, those farthest from both the community and the society, and those
farthest from the community but closest to the society value. One group choose
education so that their children move closer to the community value, while the
other group are educated because they are already close to the society value so
do not su¤er a signicant utility loss from the socializing e¤ect of education.
Surprisingly, the families at the core of community, or the representatives of
community values, will be those who do not choose education. The continua-
tion of the process from period 1 onward is hard to pin down since the value ofn
Ct
o
cannot be tracked without further details on the education choices. How-
ever, no matter how Ct evolves the families choosing education will be drawn
from one or both ends of the value distribution.
Modifying slightly the conditions of the previous argument provides an inter-
esting case for which it is possible to describe the initial change in Ct . Assume
that F () < 0 for all i with i0  ; and F
 
10

> 0: Then there will be some
value ^; ^ < ; such that F

^

= 0: Now partition the set of individuals into
the sets C1 
n
i : i0 < ^
o
and C2 
n
i : ^  i0
o
: The monotonicity of F
 
i0

implies that for all i 2 C1 we have ei0 > 0; so that i1 > i0: Similarly, for all
i 2 C2 we have ei0 = 0 so i1 = i0. These choices of education levels imply that
C0 =
1
n
P
i0 <
1
n
P
i1 = 
C
1 . It is now observed that the position at time 1
looks just like that at time 0. Two outcomes can then occur.
(i) The rst possibility is that the increase in Ct from 
C
0 to 
C
1 may result
in F (n0 ) > 0. The families with values closest to the social value will then
enter education because the loss from moving further from community values is
reduced. The situation then mirrors that of lemma 2.
(ii) The second possibility is that the movement in values of the community
families with it < 
C
t will eventually cause them to withdraw from education.
Hence, education may initially be chosen by some of the community but then
the community withdraws from education. Partial education initially can lead
to an ultimate outcome of separation.
The next set of results are built on the assumption that all families in the
community choose education so that eit > 0 for all i = 0; :::; n and all t: Dene
t by
t =
Ct +

1  2  eit Ht
2

1    eit :
It is then possible to characterize how the choice of education level depends on
family values it:
Lemma 3 At time t the level of education eit = e(
i
t; 
C
t ; 
H
t ) is strictly decreas-
ing in it for 
i
t < 

t and strictly increasing in 
i
t for 
i
t > 

t :
The next lemma shows that if society values are constant, or always adjust
towards the community values, there will be monotonicity over time in the mean
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level of community values over time and convergence of society and community
values.
Lemma 4 (i) If process P1 applies (so Ht = 
H) then
n
H   Ct
o
is a
decreasing sequence,
n
Ct
o
is an increasing sequence, and
n
e(t ; 
C
t ; 
H)
o
is an
increasing sequence. (ii) If process P2 applies (so
Ht   Ct  < f Ht   Ct )
then
n
H   Ct
o
is a decreasing sequence,
n
Ct
o
is an increasing sequence, andn
e(t ; 
C
t ; 
H)
o
is an increasing sequence.
The results in lemma 4 show that the lowest level of formal schooling that
might be chosen at time t increases over time. In addition, for any value of it
the value of L(it; e
i
t) is decreasing in 
C
t : This causes an increase in education
at every level of . It should be made clear that this result does not determine
the change over time of the level of education, eit; because the value of 
i
t also
changes for each family. For some families (generally, those with the lowest it)
these changes will be o¤setting.
The main theorem of this section provides a description of the steady state
when a positive level of education is chosen by each generation.
Theorem 1 At a steady state with e^it > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n; it must be the case
that e^it = be > 0 and ^i = b all i = 1; :::; n, and ^H = ^C = b:
The result described in Theorem 1 describes two alternative outcomes de-
pendent on the process for social values. If Ht is xed then the steady state
involves assimilation because the values of the community change with edu-
cation until they eventually become equal to the (unchanging) values of the
society. Alternatively, if Ht follows an adaptation process then the steady state
is a melting pot with convergence of community and social values to a common
nal value with b 2 C0 ; H0 .
From (10) we have that in any steady state with be > 0 the level of education
solves
v0w0 (be) = u0c0 (be) : (6)
Since v00 < 0; w00 > 0; u00 < 0; and c00 > 0; this equation may have more
than one solution, and di¤erent solutions can have di¤erent local and global
stability properties. Each solution will be a steady-state level of education, be.
Note that this condition (6) does not contain f and , and therefore the level
of be is independent of the process of adjustment. Since the community and
social values are equalized it follows that ^
C   ^H = 0: However, the level of
the common values b achieved in the steady state depends on how fast the the
communitys and the host societys values change, and therefore does depend
upon f and . Under Scenario 1 for Ht the unique steady state value of ^
C
is
H for all steady state levels of be: Under Scenario 2 for Ht each steady state
value of be may have its own steady state value of ^C :
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If there are multiple steady states they are characterized by the di¤erent
levels of education that obtained. The next theorem shows that the steady-
state equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
Theorem 2 For any two steady state levels of education be1 and be2; with be1 < be2;
W (be1) < W (be2) :
2.2 Transition paths
In section 2.1 we characterized potential steady-state equilibria of the dynamic
process determining values. For a policy analysis it is not just the steady state
that matters. The period of transition to the steady state may be long so that
it becomes important to investigate the path that the society follows to reach
the steady state. In this section we investigate an example in more details using
specic functional forms for preferences and for the weighting function. The
example isolates the factors which determine when the community may become
isolated and locked in a poverty trap, or, conversely, becomes integrated into
the host society. It also characterizes when unique or multiple equilibria occur.
For the example we assume the following functional forms:
U it = ln
 
xit

+  ln
 
wit+1
  q
2
h
it+1   Ct
i2
;

 
eit

= aeit  
b
2

eit
2
;
c
 
eit

= reit +
p
2

eit
2
;
wit+1 = w0 exp
 
eit

;
where a; b; p; q; r; ;  are non-negative constants. In particular, we assume that
the values of a and b are chosen such that assumption (3) holds everywhere along
the path and in the steady state. The parameter q measures the importance
of deviation of childs value from the community value. In the analysis this
is assumed to be constant across individuals.7 Parameter a in the weighting
function  captures the leverage of primary education on values (thus smaller
magnitudes of a correspond to higher segregation), whilst parameter b represents
how fast the impact of school norms on studentsvalues weakens at higher levels
of education.
The evolution of the value of the host society is assumed to be given by
Ht+1 = 
H
t   c

Ht   Ct

+ d

Ht   Ct
2
2Ht
; (7)
7 In the simulations we allow this parameter to vary by assuming that each family is char-
acterized by its own value of q, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution.
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where process P1 applies if c = d = 0 and P2 applies otherwise: Note that the
evolution of Ht can be re-written as
Ht+1   Ht
Ht
=  
H
t   Ct
Ht
"
c  d
2
Ht   Ct
Ht
#
;
which shows that it describes either partial adjustment at a diminishing rate or
divergence at an increasing rate.
With these functional forms the evolution of the economy is described by
the system involving (7) and
it+1 =

1  aet + b
2
e2t

it +

aet   b
2
e2t

Ht ;
eit = max f0; eg ;
with e dened as the solution to
 =
r + pe
w0 exp
 
eit 1
  re  pe2=2
+q

ae  b
2
e2Ht   Ct + it   Ct  (a  be)Ht   Ct  :
The solution describes the dynamics of the values of the community, given the
initial conditions
n
ei 1
	
;

i0
	
; H0
o
.
One can see that in this economy the steady state described in lemma 1
with et = e0 = 0 may exist for process P1 when the preferences are such that
 is small (parents put low weight on their childrens welfare) or q is large (the
parentsdiscontent with the change in childrens values is strong). It is more
likely to happen when  is small (low return to education), r and/or p are large
(the cost of education is high), or a is large (the e¤ect of schooling on values is
strong), or when (H0   C0 ) is large (the initial gap between the values of the
community and those of the host society is wide).
The outcome under process P2 with adjustment can be very di¤erent from
that for process P1. Given the same conguration of parameters, when the
host society adjusts its values toward the community it is possible that the
gap between their values shrinks from t = 0 to t = 1. Thus, in conformity with
lemma 4, given C1 = 
C
0 when e0 = 0 is chosen, is it easy to obtain the condition
H1   C1
H0   C0
< 1 if
1  c
d=2
<
H0   C0
H0
<
c
d=2
:
With a su¢ cient reduction in the distance between the values it may become
optimal for the next generation of parents to choose e1 > 0. In the next period
the gap will shrink even more as H2 approaches 
C
2 , which in turn induces
higher e2, and so forth. The process of convergence may, however, reverse, in
particular, if the strength of value transmission at school weakens signicantly
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at higher levels of education (b is su¢ ciently large relative to a). Thus, the
outcome depends on both the schooling e¤ect and the degree of adjustment of
the host society to the community.
We now briey analyze the existence of a steady state and the welfare im-
plications of multiplicity of the steady states for this economy, assuming that
the community members have identical preferences, so that Ct = t. Using the
chosen functional forms we can rewrite (6) as
v0 (w (be))
u0 (w (be)  c (be))w0 (be) = c0 (be) ;
or
w0 exp (be) = r

+

p

+ r
be+ p
2
be2; (8)
where be is the steady state level of education. Both sides of the equation are
strictly increasing and convex in be. It is easy to see that three di¤erent cases
are possible:
(i) There is no solution if w0 > max

r

;
r

+
p
2

;
(ii) There is a unique solution if
r
p
>
1
(1  )  (this ensures
r

>
r

+
p
2
)
and
r

+
p
2
< w0 <
r

;
(iii) There are two solutions if
r
p
<
1
(1  )  and
r

< w0 <
r

+
p
2
.
There are also knife-edge situations when w0 = r= () or
w0 = r= () + p=
 
2

but these are of lesser interest. In case (iii) the two
steady states are characterized by di¤erent levels of education.
The local stability property of a steady state, when it exists, is characterized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 If a steady state with strictly positive education be exists then it is
locally stable if and only if
be < 1   (1 + r)
r
"
1 +
s
1 +
p [p+ r (1  )]
[1   (1 + r)]2
#
:
3 Simulation results
In this section we present the results of simulations of the model with a het-
erogenous community (q is drawn from a uniform distribution8) for di¤erent
8We also ran simulations for a heterogenous community with di¤erent levels of education
in the rst generation, drawn from a uniform distribution. The results di¤er only in levels,
while the shapes of the paths are essentially the same.
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combinations of the magnitudes of the model parameters. The simulations are
used to discuss alternative outcomes with respect to integration, as well as how
the outcome can be inuenced by policy.
On the graphs in gures 1 and 2 we plot the choice of education, the resulting
shifts in the values of the community (blue lines) and the host society (red lines)
over time, and the path of welfare. Our simulations for various congurations
of parameter values appear to result robustly in a number of di¤erent scenar-
ios, some of which are illustrated in the gures below, as the most interesting
representative cases. In all simulations presented in this section we use w0 = 1;
 = 0:25, p = 0:2; r = 0:1; H0 = 3; 
C
0 = 1; e0 = 0;  = 0:75; c = 0:1.
Figure 1 reports simulations for two di¤erent values of b (which captures the
fall in e¤ectiveness of value transmission at higher levels of education) under
the assumption that E [q] = 0:1: Figure 2 considers two values of d (the rate of
adjustment of the host society toward the community) with E [q] = 0:5 so the
average disutility from the future deviation of childrens value from the parents
values is higher for gure 1. Contrasting the gures, it is clear that in the
second case, which can be described as a community that is more conservative,
the parents choice of education for their child is substantially lower than in the
rst case. Consequently, the values in the community do not change much over
time.
In Figure 1 the solid curves correspond to a = 1=3 and b = 9=5, and the
dashed curves correspond to a = 1=3 and b = 2=3; in both cases d = 0:5. The
choice of education is higher in the second case, but the di¤erence between the
two cases is relatively small. The shifts in the values, however, are very di¤erent:
in the rst case, characterized by a higher b, the values of the community and the
host society diverge, while in the second case the gap between values shrinks over
time. Thus, the rst situation describes a community that is well-educated but
is immune to the e¤ects of the outside culture and is not willing to integrate into
the host society; this attitude causes the initial trend in the host values towards
the community to eventually reverse. The realized dynamic path of the host
society value is non-monotone: the host society make steps towards integration
but then diverges from the community. As the community is alienated from the
host society, the latter distances itself from the community even more. In the
second case, when the e¤ect of schooling diminishes slowly, the gradual shift of
community values towards the host society is met by a reciprocal shift in the
host society values. The gap between values eventually shrinks: the two cultures
embrace each other. The welfare of the community is higher in the second case,
primarily because of the smaller loss of utility due to the more gradual change
in values.
The solid lines in gure 2 correspond to d = 0:5 and the dashed lines to
d = 0:25. The higher value of d in the rst case means that the host society
is less willing to accommodate the community when the di¤erence in values is
large relative to the rst case with lower d. (In both cases we used a = 4=3
and b = 2=3, so that the e¤ect of schooling does not diminish very much as the
amount of education increases.) It can be seen that in the rst case the distance
between the community and the host society increases over time, while education
13
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Figure 1: A­ uent isolation or a­ uent melting pot?
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remains at a rather low level. This is because the disutility from changing values
is relatively low, so the community moves towards the host society. However,
at the same time the society moves away from the community. This describes
a low-skilled community trying to imitate and become integrated into the host
culture, while the schooling system, or, indeed, the host society continues to
emphasize the di¤erence and maintains, or even increases, the distance from
the community. In the second case the host society adjusts to the community,
and both the educational outcomes and welfare are strikingly higher the latter
not only due to the higher earnings, but also because with the adjusting host
society its values, instilled in children through schooling, are now closer to the
community values and so do not cause discontent to the parents. This describes
the situation when the willingness of the host society to embrace the values of
the community is reinforced by the willingness of the community to adjust.
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Figure 2: Deprived isolation or a­ uent melting pot?
Although the model provide only a simple representation of the relationship
between values and education it is capable of generating a variety of di¤erent
scenarios of cultural integration or segregation of minority groups. These sce-
narios are characterized by di¤erent patterns of human capital accumulation and
welfare. The outcomes for the community under these scenarios are summarized
in Table 1.
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Parameters high d, low q high d, high q low d, high q
high b high-skill, reclusive high-skill, integrated high-skill, reclusive
low b high-skill, integrated low-skill, rejected high-skill, integrated
Table 1: Simulation outcomes
4 Conclusions
This paper has presented a model of the transmission of values across genera-
tions and communities and of the e¤ect that di¤erent education and integration
attitudes can have on the welfare of communities, as well as on cultural integra-
tion. We have characterized alternative steady states and, using simulations,
have compared educational and socioeconomic outcomes in di¤erent scenarios
generated by the di¤erent relative importance attributed by parents to their
traditional values and to their childrens future earnings, as well as di¤erent
school norms.
The analysis has investigated both the dynamics of the process of value
adjustment and the steady state of the process. It is possible for a steady state
with separation to arise. In such a case the community gives such importance to
values that its members prefer not to engage in education in order to prevent any
change in the traditional values. The community essentially isolates itself from
the host society. This steady state only arises under strong assumptions. If there
is dispersion of values within the community then some may choose education
for two distinct motives. Those with values far from those of the community, and
even further from society, will choose education to move their childrens values
closer to community values. Conversely, those with values closest to society will
be more concerned with the increase in childrens income than with the change
in values. If all members of the community choose education then all steady
states must involve the values of the community becoming equal to the values
of society. This can be achieved through assimilation or convergence.
Policies to reduce segregation in communities through schooling appear to
be e¤ective in raising the educational attainment of immigrants children in
the long run and a discussion of the role of institutional and social capital in
migrantsintegration and well-being can be found in Della Giusta and Kamb-
hampati (2006). Our simulations demonstrate that community values adjust
and eventually converge to society values only if segregation is relatively low
and the t between students and school norms is relatively high. The model is
necessarily simple compared to the complex reality of minority communities but
it permits di¤erent evolutions of individual values and their e¤ect on broader
community outcomes and reveals why social inclusion is not always attained.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Observe that when ei 1 = 0; 
i
1 (0) = [1   (0)] i0+  (0) H0 = i0: Substituting
this into (4) shows that F
 
i0

< 0 implies ei0 = 0; 8i: From the adjustment
process (2) it follows that i1 = 
i
0: Hence, F
 
i1

= F
 
i0

< 0 and ei1 = 0 8i:
Iterating the argument shows F
 
it+1

= F
 
it

< 0 8i; t:
Proof of Lemma 2
By denition,  maximizes 2g00 (0)
h
H0   i0
i h
i0   C0
i
: Since F
 
i0

is con-
tinuous in i0 there will an interval I
 around  such that F
 
i0

< 0 for
i0 2 I. For all i such that i0 2 I it follows that ei0 = 0. Furthermore,
2g00 (0)
h
H0   i0
i h
i0   C0
i
is monotonically increasing in i if i0 < 
; and
monotonically decreasing in i if i0 > 
: Hence, if F
 
10

> 0 there will be a
connected interval IL =
h
10; 
L
0
i
such that ei0 > 0 if 
i
0 2 I1. Alternatively, if
F (n0 ) > 0 there will be a connected interval I
R =
h
R0 ; 
n
0
i
such that ei0 > 0 if
i0 2 In.
Proof of Lemma 3
The rst-order condition for the interior educational choice at time t is
 u0c0  eit+ v0w0  eit  2g00  eitL(it; eit) = 0; (9)
where L(it; e
i
t) is dened in (5). Observe that L(
i
t; e
i
t) has a maximum at
t =
Ct +

1  2  eit Ht
2

1    eit ;
and at this maximum
L(t ; e
i
t) =
h
Ht   Ct
i2
4

1    eit > 0:
Furthermore, L(it; e
i
t) is strictly increasing in 
i
t for 
i
t < 

t ;strictly decreasing
in it for 
i
t > 

t ; and, since 
0  eit > 0; L(it; eit) is strictly increasing in eit:
These properties of L(it; e
i
t) imply the claims for e(
i
t; 
C
t ; 
H
t ):
Proof of Lemma 4
(i) From (2) and the fact that eit > 0 it follows that
H   it+1 < H   it for
all i: In addition, Ct+1 > 
C
t and that 

t+1 > 

t : These observations demonstrate
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the rst two statements. By denition
L(t ; e) =
h
H   Ct
i2
4 [1   (e)] > 0:
But since Ct+1 > 
C
t is follows that
L(t+1; e) < L(

t ; e)
for all e. As a consequence e(t+1; 
C
t+1; 
H) > e(t ; 
C
t ; 
H) and the lowest
chosen level of formal education (over  at time t) is increasing over time. The
proof extends obviously to (ii).
Proof of Theorem 1
The community members have identical preferences. Therefore, in a steady
state with a positive level of education, eit = be > 0. The values of be; ^C ; and ^H
will satisfy
v0w0 (be) = u0c0 (be)  2g00 (be) h^C   ^Hi2  (be) ; (10)
and
^
C
=
h
1  

e

^
C
; ^
H
i
^
C
+ 

e

^
C
; ^
H

^
H
: (11)
Proof of Theorem 2
The steady state level of utility is given by
W (be) = u (w (be)  c (be)) + v (w (be)) :
Di¤erentiation with respect to be gives
W 0 (be) = u0 (w (be)  c (be)) [w0 (be)  c0 (be)] + v0 (w (be))w0 (be)
= u0 (w (be)  c (be))w0 (be) > 0:
This establishes the result.
Proof of Theorem 3
The local stability of a given steady state is determined by the magnitude of
det=det 1 at the point et = et 1 = be. Straightforward calculations give
det
det 1

e
=
w0 (be)
c0 (be) + p = w (be)c0 (be) + p
=

h
c (be) + c0(be) i
c0 (be) + p ;
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where the last equality follows from (8). The steady state is locally stable
when this quantity is between zero and one; for this to be the case  has to
be su¢ ciently large,  su¢ ciently small, and p su¢ cienty small. The stability
condition can be rewritten as
pbe2   2 [1   (1 + r)] be  p

  r (1  ) < 0: (12)
The discriminant of the quadratic polynomial in be in (12) is given by
D
4
= [1   (1 + r)]2 + p [p+ r (1  )] > 0;
assuming  < 1 Therefore, the polynomial in (12) has two real-valued roots,
and the inequality in (12) holds for be 2 (e ; e+), where
e =
[1   (1 + r)]
q
[1   (1 + r)]2 + p [p+ r (1  )]
p
:
Clearly, e+ > 0 and e  < 0, and so the steady state with be < e+ is locally
stable, whereas the steady state with be > e+ is locally unstable.
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